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Evidently, if the appeal to nature is foolishness, it is natural foolishness, and as such deserves some attempt at sympathetic understanding.  A notable attempt at a balanced view is provided by Bertrand Russell.  In "What I Believe" he says

There is a certain attitude about the application of science to human life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the last analysis, agree with it.  It is the attitude of those who dread what is "unnatural."...  I think there is a mixture of truth and falsehood in the admiration of "nature" which it is important to disentangle.  To begin with, what is "natural"?  Roughly speaking, anything to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood....  Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by most of the apostles of nature, though they object to new fashions in either....  [T]hose who preach "nature" are inconsistent, and one is tempted to regard them as mere conservatives.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said in their favor....  [I]n the absence of knowledge, unexpected harm may be done by a new departure from nature; but when the harm has come to be understood it can usually be remedied by some new artificiality.  As regards our physical environment and our physical means of gratifying our desires, I do not think the doctrine of "nature" justifies anything beyond a certain experimental caution in the adoption of new expedients.  Clothes, for instance, are contrary to nature and need to be supplemented by another unnatural practice --- namely, washing --- if they are not to bring disease.  But the two practices together make a man healthier than the savage who eschews both.

There is more to be said for "nature" in the realm of human desires.  To force upon a man, woman, or child a life which thwarts their strongest impulses is both cruel and dangerous; in this sense, a life according to "nature" is to be commended with certain provisos.  Nothing could be more artificial than an underground electric railway, but no violence is done to a child's nature when it is taken to travel in one; on the contrary, almost all children find the experience delightful.  Artificialities which gratify the desires of ordinary human beings are good, other things being equal.  But there is nothing to be said for ways of life which are artificial in the sense of being imposed by authority or economic necessity....

To the charming example of children in subway cars one might, in our day, add the potent one of children using computers.

In "Scylla and Charybdis, or Communism and Fascism", tho, he loses his balance:

...Where living beings are concerned, and most of all in the case of human beings, spontaneous growth tends to produce certain results, and others can be produced only by means of a certain stress and strain.  Embryologists may produce beasts with two heads, or with a nose where a toe should be; but such monstrosities do not find life very pleasant....  It is possible to cut shrubs into the shape of peacocks, and by a similar violence a similar distortion can be inflicted upon human beings.  But the shrub remains passive, while the man...remains active, if not in one sphere then in another.  The shrub cannot pass on the lesson in the use of shears which the gardener has been teaching, but the distorted human being can always find humbler human beings upon whom he can wield smaller shears.  The inevitable effects of artificial moulding upon human beings are to produce either cruelty or listlessness, perhaps both in alternation....

...The ultimate psychological argument for democracy and for patience is that an element of free growth, of go as you please and untrained natural living, is essential if men are not to become misshapen monsters....

I fancy there are better arguments for democracy & patience than that.  One might retort that nature can produce monstrosities without the help of embryologists; that they need not find life any less pleasant than their normal parents do, and may even be the beginnings of new species; and that we can hardly avoid artificial molding of human beings, which are (as Skinner points out) the most domesticated species of all.  In this respect even the earlier passage is somewhat incoherent.  People's "strongest impulses" are not necessarily the natural ones.

Mention of children, however, does bring up one fact about human nature that is of great moral importance --- tho more for the problems it creates than for the guidance it provides.  That is the fact that as infants we need to be taken care of, and so as a species we have to be provided with instincts for caring and for being cared for.  We share that program, of course, with other mammals & with birds, but we have carried it to an extreme.  A vast range of habits, including especially those that enable us to live together, is left to upbringing.  As Isaac Asimov ("No Connection") imagines an intelligent bear describing us, we are "gregarious without being social":  We have an inborn need to live with each other, but no inborn ways to do it.  That means, in particular, that the notion of liberty has to be reconstructed in each individual over a period of years.  (From the way some libertarians talk, you might think they had hatched & walked away on all eight legs.)

IMO nature deserves far more respect in esthetics than in ethics.  It is odd that people tend to think of esthetics in connection with art; it seems to me that most of the ugliness in the world is due to art (e.g., make-up, motel signs, Mylar balloons, newspaper advertising supplements, rock and roll, small-business storefronts, and station breaks on vulgar radio stations), and most of the beauty is due to nature.  Except for music, I see little use in trying to create beauty; it is more important to find it & try to avoid destroying it.
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In medicine and ethics there is a strong tendency to identify nature, in some sense, with norms.  One can get away with that in some cases, but a lot depends on details.  Here I consider four specimen organs.

3.1  Hearts

Hearts pump blood, and that is almost all they are good for. That was discovered only recently, and only in one culture, but is true of all human beings thruout the ages.  Consequently, the criteria for a good heart are pretty straightforward.  If the valves leak, or the muscles contract in the wrong order, physicians are entitled to give those conditions long, nasty names and do what they can to remedy them.

It is true that hearts have another use: they reveal to each of us, and to others who have gotten close enough, something of our emotional state.  People used to believe that that meant the heart produced the emotions, and metaphors based on that belief (and more vaguely on the position of the heart within the body) are still common:  We say "broken-hearted" and "put your heart into it" and


  I put my hand upon my heart
  And swore that we would never part.
  I wonder what I should have said
  If I had put it on my head.

However, few people these days take such talk literally; everybody knows that emotion as well as intellect is mostly in the brain, and that the two are intimately mixed.  Awareness of heartbeats is not of great importance in civilized life.  If a patient is given an artificial heart that pumps blood quietly, sensible people do not regard the cure as incomplete.

3.2  Feet

Human feet are mostly used for walking & running, and can mostly be judged by their effectiveness for those purposes.  In that respect they are almost like hearts, tho their design is not nearly so well perfected, probably because they came much later in our natural history.  Feet, however, can also be used for stamping, which is useful for killing small animals, putting out small fires, and expressing certain emotions.  In the wild, our soles were thick, and we did not need shoes for those purposes.  (I once knew a lady from Kenya who in childhood had run 20 miles to & from school every day; she brought such soles with her to college, where they did her no harm.)

Finally, feet can be used for kicking.  For that, however, nature has equipped us poorly (by the standard of, say, horses), and I don't suppose there is much of it in cultures that haven't invented shoes.  Besides expressing emotion, kicking can be used for breaking things and in various stages of fighting.  But in civilization its main use is in propelling small objects for amusement.  Kicking is thus contrary to nature in two senses: it is a deviation from the most usual & conspicuous use of our feet, and it requires artificial avoidance of natural consequences.  Does that make football a perversion?  I leave it to His Holiness to bring that news to Notre Dame.

I recently saw a photograph of the feet of a man whose people spend a lot of their lives climbing trees barefoot.  They were not shaped like yours or mine, but they were probably good at what he needed them for.  If he came to civilization & were examined by a naive doctor, she probably would look in vain in the literature for the name of his deformity, and would recommend either some elaborate surgery or amputation & prosthesis.  She would have a point:  As he was, he would have trouble buying shoes, and in his new tribe he would not often wish to climb trees barefoot.

3.3  Sexual organs

The sexual organs are often called reproductive organs, and that is reasonable in that if you or I want to reproduce, the use of those organs is usually the easiest way.  It is not reasonable, tho, to say that sex is for reproduction, even in the sense that hearts are for pumping blood or feet are (mostly) for walking.  From the top down --- considering first reproduction & then sexual reproduction --- the sexual aspect is an impediment rather than a means.  Suppose there were a species that, instead of sexual reproduction, had sexual vision.  Half the individuals would have eye sockets with retinas but no lenses; the other half would have no eyes but would have a lens at the end of each little finger.  In order for a pair of them to see, a male would have to climb onto a female's back and lock his hands over her face.  Wouldn't you wonder how such an awkward arrangement could be selected for, by natural selection or even by intelligent design?  And yet, when it comes to reproduction, which is far more fundamental biologically than vision, we take it for granted.

In fact, biologists are not agreed on why sex is so common.  It is urged that the mixing of genes is essential to adaptation & speciation; but bacteria manage that without complementary organs and the requirement of one organism from column M & one from column F.  Even among animals, there are parthenogenetic lizards and rotifers.  (The lizards even go thru the motions of mating.  Do they count as lesbians?  The alliteration is tempting.)  True, the lizards are evolutionary dead ends; but it appears that the rotifers have managed to evolve & speciate without the help of males.  The trouble with the rest of us, according to one suggestion, is that in us an obscure but essential biochemical pathway is blocked unless we mate, and the rotifers have found another way around the blockage.

Another idea is that multicellular organisms fall into this bifurcation because of some long-term instability in the very process of their reproduction.  Perhaps traits as well as organisms can be parasitic, and sex is a parasitic trait, propagating without actually improving the fitness of the individuals or species it infests.  (That might be true, in particular, if it were helpful for speciation.)  It does seem that most of the individuals so afflicted are miserable or dead, and most of the species are extinct.

However that may be, it is clear that in judging the use of the sexual organs, an appeal to nature is even less plausible that it is for feet.  If there is objection to their being used to express this or that emotion, or for this or that kind of play, then that objection had better depend on details.

3.4  Brains

Brains are badly understood, and they have a variety of uses, for good or ill.  A lot of doctors say they know what constitutes proper fuctioning of brains ("mental health"), but they are bluffing, like the priests before them.  Indeed, it may turn out best to say that a brain is not one organ, but a collection of several thousand, forced to live together by their confinement in the same skull and by the needs of cooperation & competition for access to the various sensory & motor nerves, in something like a political process.  (Such ideas may be found in The Society of Mind by Marvin Minsky.)  If so, then it is likely that each individual is missing some of them thru genetic accident or early deprivation of exercise, so that we are all several dozen kinds of cripple, but manage thru various workarounds.  Also, it may well be that an organ's participation in one possible coalition makes it unavailable to others, so that again there have to be workarounds.  In such a situation, the notion of normality will not be helpful.
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2.1  Nature as a stand-in for God

If you do not believe in God, it is rhetorically helpful to have some other powerful authority to appeal to.  That has been an increasingly important maneuver among primitivists in recent times.

If you do believe in God, then nature is part of Creation, so it has to be good in some sense; but some parts of Creation are embarrassing.  Thus, calling something natural is a way of intimating that it is good or at least tolerable without the blasphemy of calling it divine.  For this purpose, nature is often personified as female and called Mother Nature.  That, of course, is heretical if taken seriously: it was not God the Father who needed an help meet for him.  In the Christian scheme, as Chesterton justly complained, Nature is not our mother but our sister.  In either case, however, making her female eases the notion of her doing God's dirty work.  Having to piss or shit is a "call of Nature" --- part of a mother's job, no doubt; "call of God" would be in terrible taste.  "Nature's Mistakes", the sign at the freak show used to say:  "God's Mistakes" would have been blasphemous, and "Mistakes of Nature and of Nature's God" would really have been giving the show away.

The substitution of Nature for God can also be a license for harmless fun.  Burns says:


  Auld Nature swears, the lovely Dears
    Her noblest work she classes, O:
  Her prentice han' she try'd on man,
    An' then she made the lasses, O.

Nature made man first --- but that was only for practice!  Burns could not have gotten away with making that joke about God.

Mencken, who was a skeptic, had another kind of fun:


The central aim of civilization, it must be plain, is simply to defy and correct the obvious intent of God, _e.g._, that the issue of every love affair shall be a succession of little strangers, that cows shall devote themselves wholly to nursing their calves, that it shall take longer to convey a message from New York to Chicago than it takes to convey one from New York to Newark, that the wicked shall be miserable and the virtuous happy....

2.2  Nature as an excuse

In some arguments (most notably, these days, those about homosexuality), it is supposed to be important whether certain desires and behavior are genetically determined or are due to environmental influences.  Heredity, being due to "nature", is supposed to be unchangeable or perhaps divinely inspired; contrary environmental influences are supposed to represent culpable choice or Satanic perversion.  There is no sense in any of this kind of talk.  Genetic tendencies can be resisted; indeed, because they conflict, some of them have to be --- even if they are not wicked, which some of them are.  (A great deal of evil has deep roots in human nature.  If I had to choose one Christian dogma to believe in, I think it would be Original Sin.)  And plenty of learned tendencies are far more difficult to change than many inherited ones.

The fact that my hair was once blond & is now gray is undoubtedly due to hereditary influences.  It is also partly a matter of choice, because yonder lady in the supermarket has dyed hers orange, and I could do the same if I wished.  If I had become a beach bum in my youth, there would have been streaks in my hair, and that would have been due to environmental causes.

The fact that I speak English is undoubtedly due to my childhood environment.  The fact that yonder Cambodian immigrant in the laundromat speaks English is a matter of choice (more precisely, the choice of a package that includes that as well as wealth, freedom, and a smaller chance of getting shot); he is following up that choice with some effort.

A law against speaking English would be far more oppressive to me than a law against gray hair, altho I was born with a propensity to the latter & not the former.  Either law would be beyond the moral competence of government.  Whether getting rid of either would be worth a shooting war is a prudential question, as stated in the Declaration of Independence.  Nature & nurture have nothing to do with it.
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The appeal to nature as a criterion (or the criterion) of value is an ancient habit of our culture whose continuing popularity has irritated me for most of my life.  It is in Aristotle and the canon law and the Declaration of Independence and the advertisements for shampoo.  Some years ago I looked up "nature" in a philosophical dictionary & was steered to a wonderful book (Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity, by Arthur O. Lovejoy & George Boas), whose appendix listed 66 overlapping & conflicting definitions of "nature", most of them commendatory and almost all of them, it seemed to me, silly.  The one that makes the most sense to me is No. 17:  Nature is the exterior of artifice.  To say that metallic aluminum is not found in nature, but metallic gold is, is to say that if I find a piece of aluminum in a stream bed, someone put it there; if I find a piece of gold, perhaps not.  That is a useful notion, but it has no more moral content than "outdoors".

Here I mean to say, in the plainest possible language, why the rest is all shampoo to me.
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I could go on for quite a while listing arithmetical statements that I believe, but I suppose it would be more exciting to mention things that I believe and most people don't:

This would be a better world to live & die in if suicide could be made the most common cause of death.

The stock market has very little to do with the operation of market capitalism.

The economists, who have taught the biologists so much, would do well to learn something from them: that successful systems accumulate parasites.  Among the vilest institutional evils in the rich countries are the promotion industry (parasitic on the market) and the drug laws (parasitic on the government).  Right, shmight!  Left, shmeft!  Markets and governments are both too powerful; far more of what people do for each other should be done for fun, without the mediation of either.

To understand oppression the second thing one should always do is blame the victim; the taboo on doing so is stultifying.  In particular, people who let themselves be influenced by television advertising are asking to be swindled, and by thus creating a market for swindlers they poison the entire body politic.

Mass entertainment (by which I mean entertainment in which the chief measure of success is the size of the audience) is a morally depraved activity.  In order to maximize the size of an audience, one must make use of fashion and intergenerational hostility -- that is, of fear and hate.  Those are base motives, and the business of appealing to them is bound to attract bad people and make them worse.

Many undoubted evils are irremediable.  (It must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh!)  In particular, the problems posed by ethnic pest zones such as the Middle East and the Balkan peninsula are insoluble.

Neither art nor nature is a moral category; they are merely the interior & exterior of the region that has been altered by deliberate human activity; they have no more moral content than indoors & outdoors.  In particular, to call behavior or food or rights natural is not to recommend them.

That should do to go on.
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Reading: The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society by Frans de Waal (2009).

Jim gave it to me.

As the title indicates, the idea of this book is to promote a change in the moral climate, from the recently fashionable social Darwinism & market-worship to a greater reliance on cooperative motives. The author hopes that the recent economic shock will make such a project feasible, and he essays to contribute to it, as a primatologist, by arguing that cooperation is as much a part of animal nature (including human nature) as is competition.

This thesis to some extent offends my prejudices. I tend to think of human cooperation, and even affection, as largely a matter of artifice. My point of view is well summarized by the aphorism of an intelligent bear in an early story by Isaac Asimov: We are "gregarious without being social"; we have an inborn need to live with each other, but no inborn way to do it. But actually (at least in some moods), de Waal does not greatly disagree with me. He looks to nature for resources, not for instructions:

...one can't derive the goals of society from the goals of nature.... All that nature can offer is information and inspiration, not prescription.
 
The book of nature is like the Bible:  Everyone reads into it what they want, from tolerance to intolerance, and from altruism to greed.
 
However, it is very hard, in Western civilization, to avoid rhetoric based on the notion that nature embodies advice from God, and de Waal sometimes writes in a way that may suggest such a thing to the unwary:  He quotes Darwin to the effect that any animal "endowed with well-marked social instincts" will be bound to develop morality as soon as it develops sufficient intellect, and comments:
 
 
...an interest in others is fundamental.  Where would human morality be without it?  It's the bedrock on which everything else is constructed.
 
 
"Fundamental" & "bedrock", IMO, are words to avoid in such discourse, because they carry a lot of distracting baggage.  "Necessary" and "material" (from which) would have been safer.  Likewise, in
 
We can't return to [the] preindustrial way of life....  Yet...we remain essentially the same animal....
 

I could do without "essentially".

In Chapter 4 he makes a distinction between sympathy & empathy, pretty much as I learned it in school:  Empathy is modeling the feelings of others; sympathy is making them one's own, which conduces to helpful action.  But he does not keep it up:  Later on, we find Schadenfreude described (twice) as "the opposite of empathy", and we are told that psychopaths "successfully fake empathy".

Another instance of risky diction is the use of "direct" in

Empathy offers direct access to "the foreign self."
 
and

Emotional contagion relies on a direct channel between the other's and our own emotions.
 
de Waal does not mean he believes in telepathy, but some careless & hopeful readers are sure to think he does.

The writing is sometimes (in the view of this literate 72-year-old) vulgar as well as sloppy:  "Both views sound similar" (to each other); "incredible survival value"; "by British political philosopher Herbert Spencer"; "historical papers" (not about history).  However, this is de Waal's book, not mine, and he is only keeping down with the times.  Probably anyone who happens to read these examples will not even understand what is irritating me.

Inasmuch as this book deals with the ontogeny as well as the phylogeny of morals, it seems odd that Piaget is nowhere mentioned.  I read a little of him 50 years ago, and he seemed a careful observer.  Is he so greatly out of fashion now?
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Listening:  "The Luck of Roaring Camp" by Bret Harte

One of my favorite short stories, an exercise in microsociology whose sentimentality is relieved by a sharp sense of irony.  The only woman in a mining camp dies in childbirth, and the camp adopts the baby.  His presence gradually teaches the ruffians courtesy, hygiene, quiet enjoyment, esthetic sensibility, and (alas) respectability.  No happy ending.

You can read it at
http://www.bartleby.com/310/4/1.html

Besides being funny & instructive, this story is valuable to me as a corrective to my philosophical prejudices.  I am skeptical of, and on the whole hostile to, the prevailing view that nature (somehow defined) is a source, or even the source, of moral judgment.  On the whole I agree with the lady in Agee's movie that human nature is something we are supposed to rise above.  However, meditating on this story forces me to concede that our being mammals counts for something.

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