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Evidently, if the appeal to nature is foolishness, it is natural foolishness, and as such deserves some attempt at sympathetic understanding.  A notable attempt at a balanced view is provided by Bertrand Russell.  In "What I Believe" he says

There is a certain attitude about the application of science to human life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the last analysis, agree with it.  It is the attitude of those who dread what is "unnatural."...  I think there is a mixture of truth and falsehood in the admiration of "nature" which it is important to disentangle.  To begin with, what is "natural"?  Roughly speaking, anything to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood....  Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by most of the apostles of nature, though they object to new fashions in either....  [T]hose who preach "nature" are inconsistent, and one is tempted to regard them as mere conservatives.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said in their favor....  [I]n the absence of knowledge, unexpected harm may be done by a new departure from nature; but when the harm has come to be understood it can usually be remedied by some new artificiality.  As regards our physical environment and our physical means of gratifying our desires, I do not think the doctrine of "nature" justifies anything beyond a certain experimental caution in the adoption of new expedients.  Clothes, for instance, are contrary to nature and need to be supplemented by another unnatural practice --- namely, washing --- if they are not to bring disease.  But the two practices together make a man healthier than the savage who eschews both.

There is more to be said for "nature" in the realm of human desires.  To force upon a man, woman, or child a life which thwarts their strongest impulses is both cruel and dangerous; in this sense, a life according to "nature" is to be commended with certain provisos.  Nothing could be more artificial than an underground electric railway, but no violence is done to a child's nature when it is taken to travel in one; on the contrary, almost all children find the experience delightful.  Artificialities which gratify the desires of ordinary human beings are good, other things being equal.  But there is nothing to be said for ways of life which are artificial in the sense of being imposed by authority or economic necessity....

To the charming example of children in subway cars one might, in our day, add the potent one of children using computers.

In "Scylla and Charybdis, or Communism and Fascism", tho, he loses his balance:

...Where living beings are concerned, and most of all in the case of human beings, spontaneous growth tends to produce certain results, and others can be produced only by means of a certain stress and strain.  Embryologists may produce beasts with two heads, or with a nose where a toe should be; but such monstrosities do not find life very pleasant....  It is possible to cut shrubs into the shape of peacocks, and by a similar violence a similar distortion can be inflicted upon human beings.  But the shrub remains passive, while the man...remains active, if not in one sphere then in another.  The shrub cannot pass on the lesson in the use of shears which the gardener has been teaching, but the distorted human being can always find humbler human beings upon whom he can wield smaller shears.  The inevitable effects of artificial moulding upon human beings are to produce either cruelty or listlessness, perhaps both in alternation....

...The ultimate psychological argument for democracy and for patience is that an element of free growth, of go as you please and untrained natural living, is essential if men are not to become misshapen monsters....

I fancy there are better arguments for democracy & patience than that.  One might retort that nature can produce monstrosities without the help of embryologists; that they need not find life any less pleasant than their normal parents do, and may even be the beginnings of new species; and that we can hardly avoid artificial molding of human beings, which are (as Skinner points out) the most domesticated species of all.  In this respect even the earlier passage is somewhat incoherent.  People's "strongest impulses" are not necessarily the natural ones.

Mention of children, however, does bring up one fact about human nature that is of great moral importance --- tho more for the problems it creates than for the guidance it provides.  That is the fact that as infants we need to be taken care of, and so as a species we have to be provided with instincts for caring and for being cared for.  We share that program, of course, with other mammals & with birds, but we have carried it to an extreme.  A vast range of habits, including especially those that enable us to live together, is left to upbringing.  As Isaac Asimov ("No Connection") imagines an intelligent bear describing us, we are "gregarious without being social":  We have an inborn need to live with each other, but no inborn ways to do it.  That means, in particular, that the notion of liberty has to be reconstructed in each individual over a period of years.  (From the way some libertarians talk, you might think they had hatched & walked away on all eight legs.)

IMO nature deserves far more respect in esthetics than in ethics.  It is odd that people tend to think of esthetics in connection with art; it seems to me that most of the ugliness in the world is due to art (e.g., make-up, motel signs, Mylar balloons, newspaper advertising supplements, rock and roll, small-business storefronts, and station breaks on vulgar radio stations), and most of the beauty is due to nature.  Except for music, I see little use in trying to create beauty; it is more important to find it & try to avoid destroying it.
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In medicine and ethics there is a strong tendency to identify nature, in some sense, with norms.  One can get away with that in some cases, but a lot depends on details.  Here I consider four specimen organs.

3.1  Hearts

Hearts pump blood, and that is almost all they are good for. That was discovered only recently, and only in one culture, but is true of all human beings thruout the ages.  Consequently, the criteria for a good heart are pretty straightforward.  If the valves leak, or the muscles contract in the wrong order, physicians are entitled to give those conditions long, nasty names and do what they can to remedy them.

It is true that hearts have another use: they reveal to each of us, and to others who have gotten close enough, something of our emotional state.  People used to believe that that meant the heart produced the emotions, and metaphors based on that belief (and more vaguely on the position of the heart within the body) are still common:  We say "broken-hearted" and "put your heart into it" and


  I put my hand upon my heart
  And swore that we would never part.
  I wonder what I should have said
  If I had put it on my head.

However, few people these days take such talk literally; everybody knows that emotion as well as intellect is mostly in the brain, and that the two are intimately mixed.  Awareness of heartbeats is not of great importance in civilized life.  If a patient is given an artificial heart that pumps blood quietly, sensible people do not regard the cure as incomplete.

3.2  Feet

Human feet are mostly used for walking & running, and can mostly be judged by their effectiveness for those purposes.  In that respect they are almost like hearts, tho their design is not nearly so well perfected, probably because they came much later in our natural history.  Feet, however, can also be used for stamping, which is useful for killing small animals, putting out small fires, and expressing certain emotions.  In the wild, our soles were thick, and we did not need shoes for those purposes.  (I once knew a lady from Kenya who in childhood had run 20 miles to & from school every day; she brought such soles with her to college, where they did her no harm.)

Finally, feet can be used for kicking.  For that, however, nature has equipped us poorly (by the standard of, say, horses), and I don't suppose there is much of it in cultures that haven't invented shoes.  Besides expressing emotion, kicking can be used for breaking things and in various stages of fighting.  But in civilization its main use is in propelling small objects for amusement.  Kicking is thus contrary to nature in two senses: it is a deviation from the most usual & conspicuous use of our feet, and it requires artificial avoidance of natural consequences.  Does that make football a perversion?  I leave it to His Holiness to bring that news to Notre Dame.

I recently saw a photograph of the feet of a man whose people spend a lot of their lives climbing trees barefoot.  They were not shaped like yours or mine, but they were probably good at what he needed them for.  If he came to civilization & were examined by a naive doctor, she probably would look in vain in the literature for the name of his deformity, and would recommend either some elaborate surgery or amputation & prosthesis.  She would have a point:  As he was, he would have trouble buying shoes, and in his new tribe he would not often wish to climb trees barefoot.

3.3  Sexual organs

The sexual organs are often called reproductive organs, and that is reasonable in that if you or I want to reproduce, the use of those organs is usually the easiest way.  It is not reasonable, tho, to say that sex is for reproduction, even in the sense that hearts are for pumping blood or feet are (mostly) for walking.  From the top down --- considering first reproduction & then sexual reproduction --- the sexual aspect is an impediment rather than a means.  Suppose there were a species that, instead of sexual reproduction, had sexual vision.  Half the individuals would have eye sockets with retinas but no lenses; the other half would have no eyes but would have a lens at the end of each little finger.  In order for a pair of them to see, a male would have to climb onto a female's back and lock his hands over her face.  Wouldn't you wonder how such an awkward arrangement could be selected for, by natural selection or even by intelligent design?  And yet, when it comes to reproduction, which is far more fundamental biologically than vision, we take it for granted.

In fact, biologists are not agreed on why sex is so common.  It is urged that the mixing of genes is essential to adaptation & speciation; but bacteria manage that without complementary organs and the requirement of one organism from column M & one from column F.  Even among animals, there are parthenogenetic lizards and rotifers.  (The lizards even go thru the motions of mating.  Do they count as lesbians?  The alliteration is tempting.)  True, the lizards are evolutionary dead ends; but it appears that the rotifers have managed to evolve & speciate without the help of males.  The trouble with the rest of us, according to one suggestion, is that in us an obscure but essential biochemical pathway is blocked unless we mate, and the rotifers have found another way around the blockage.

Another idea is that multicellular organisms fall into this bifurcation because of some long-term instability in the very process of their reproduction.  Perhaps traits as well as organisms can be parasitic, and sex is a parasitic trait, propagating without actually improving the fitness of the individuals or species it infests.  (That might be true, in particular, if it were helpful for speciation.)  It does seem that most of the individuals so afflicted are miserable or dead, and most of the species are extinct.

However that may be, it is clear that in judging the use of the sexual organs, an appeal to nature is even less plausible that it is for feet.  If there is objection to their being used to express this or that emotion, or for this or that kind of play, then that objection had better depend on details.

3.4  Brains

Brains are badly understood, and they have a variety of uses, for good or ill.  A lot of doctors say they know what constitutes proper fuctioning of brains ("mental health"), but they are bluffing, like the priests before them.  Indeed, it may turn out best to say that a brain is not one organ, but a collection of several thousand, forced to live together by their confinement in the same skull and by the needs of cooperation & competition for access to the various sensory & motor nerves, in something like a political process.  (Such ideas may be found in The Society of Mind by Marvin Minsky.)  If so, then it is likely that each individual is missing some of them thru genetic accident or early deprivation of exercise, so that we are all several dozen kinds of cripple, but manage thru various workarounds.  Also, it may well be that an organ's participation in one possible coalition makes it unavailable to others, so that again there have to be workarounds.  In such a situation, the notion of normality will not be helpful.
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Reading:  Koestler: The Literary and Political Odyssey of a Twentieth-Century Skeptic, by Michael Scammell (2009)

Bought & read because Arthur Koestler has been a tall figure in my intellectual landscape since he & George Orwell cured me of fellowtraveling in my adolescence (early 1950s).  I have returned frequently to his many autobiographical books as well as Darkness at Noon, Arrival and Departure, Thieves in the Night, and (an oddity of mine, it turns out) The Age of Longing.  I did not, however, keep up with him in his move to philosophy and science during his later years (except for The Sleepwalkers).  Thus, this book rounds out my acquaintance with him, both in filling in what he left out in his own extensive accounts, and in describing the sometimes crazy excursions he made after I stopped reading him.

The process is often distressing.  Scammell is skeptical of accusations that Koestler was a "serial rapist", but abundantly documents that he treated his women meanly & had far more of them than he deserved.  I am sentimental about sex, and the news that someone got laid (whether in fact or in fiction) regularly improves my opinion of the human race; but in this book, for the first time, I got tired of hearing about it.  Of course, one must remember that such behavior is prompted by some widespread vileness in human nature, that in his times & places society largely seconded that vileness, and that fame greatly increases the temptation to indulge in it.  (The same can be said about his record as a serial drunken driver --- he spent a good deal of time in prison, but not, alas, for that.)  Koestler seems to have gotten his start on abusing women in a poisonous relation with his mother.

As I have hinted, I was disappointed to learn that The Age of Longing was not numbered among Koestler's best works, and that he himself regarded it as a failure.  I have found it immensely instructive (even more so than Darkness at Noon) and in parts beautiful.  I first read it in my undergraduate years, when its frank description of the hero's impotence with a whore caused it to be passed around at Caltech.  True, its satire on the atmosphere of the early Cold War makes it a period piece; but I trust the author, as in all his work, to have rendered faithfully the kinds of arguments people were having in that milieu, and that is always valuable, because we all tend to forget how silly we can be.  Also, his vignettes of various characters & situations have for me an intense charm.  I am grateful to Scammell for quelling my suspicion that the book had been subsidized by the CIA, with which Koestler turns out to have been on bad terms at the time.

Scammell is unsympathetic with Koestler's late dalliances with parapsychology & other such stuff with the stink of superstition about it, and I am more so.  They seem to be due to the same cause as his many services to decency: disillusion with the murderous cults of reason that arose from the French Revolution & its sequelae.  Koestler traces them back to the conflict between Kepler the mystic and Galileo the scientist.  There is some irony to that.  Galileo (we learn from The Sleepwalkers) called Kepler a crackpot.  He was right about that; but Kepler was right about the orbit of Mars being an ellipse (pretty near), and if you are doing astronomy, being right about the orbit of Mars is more important than being right about who is a crackpot.  Koestler took Kepler's side (indeed, even identified with him: "K = K") and blamed Galileo's tactlessness for starting off science on a collision course with religion.  Newton, on the other hand, kept his eye on the ball.  He extracted Kepler's three laws of planetary motion from his mass of gaudy nonsense, combined them with Galileo's astronomical discoveries & insights into mechanics, and thus --- after inventing the necessary mathematics --- provided a beautiful and useful theory, all without bothering to insult any bishops.  With that synthesis in hand, it was rather desperate of Koestler to inscribe "Back to Kepler!" on his banner.  There are plenty of cogent reasons for being skeptical about claims to scientific rigor in political theory, without disturbing Kepler of his rest.  A temperate discussion may be found in "The Case Against Intellect", Chapter VI in The House of Intellect by Jacques Barzun (1959).

For all that, he did a lot of good and brightened my life.

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