come_to_think: (Default)
Bertrand Russell, in A History of Western Philosophy, Chapter XXX:

It is clear that "inquiry," as conceived by [John] Dewey, is part of the general process of trying to make the world more organic. "Unified wholes" are to be the outcome of inquiries. Dewey's love of what is organic is due partly to biology, partly to the lingering influence of Hegel. Unless on the basis of an unconscious Hegelian metaphysic, I do not see why inquiry should be expected to result in "unified wholes." If I am given a pack of cards in disorder, and asked to inquire into their sequence, I shall, if I follow Dewey's prescription, first arrange them in order, and then say that this was the order resulting from inquiry. There will be, it is true, an "objective transformation of objective subject-matter" while I am arranging the cards, but the definition allows for this. If, at the end, I am told: "We wanted to know the sequence of the cards when they were given to you, not after you had re-arranged them," I shall, if I am a disciple of Dewey, reply: "Your ideas are altogether too static. I am a dynamic person, and when I inquire into any subject-matter I first alter it in such a way as to make the inquiry easy." The notion that such a procedure is legitimate can only be justified by a Hegelian distinction of appearance and reality: the appearance may be confused and fragmentary, but the reality is always orderly and organic. Therefore when I arrange the cards I am only revealing their true eternal nature....

If I am given a series of photons---say, a beam of sunlight---and asked to inquire into their polarizations, I will interpose a polarizing filter, whose axis I may orient as I please. Regardless of my choice, half of the photons' polarizations will flip parallel to that axis, and pass thru in that condition; the other half will flip perpendicular to it, and be absorbed. The photons came in with their polarizations every which way; but to inquire what they were in detail, I have to perform an objective transformation of objective subject matter.

George Orwell, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Three, III:

"What are the stars?" said O'Brien indifferently. "They are bits of fire a few kilometers away. We could reach them if we wanted to. Or we could blot them out...."
"For certain purposes, of course, that is not true. When we navigate the ocean, or when we predict an eclipse, we often find it convenient to assume that the earth goes round the sun and that the stars are millions upon millions of kilometers away. But what of it? Do you suppose it is beyond us to produce a dual system of astronomy? The stars can be near or distant, according as we need them. Do you suppose our mathematicians are unequal to that? Have you forgotten doublethink?"

Our mathematicians are equal to producing a formalism in which an electron is treated as a particle or a wave or a cloud, as circumstances require. Why not include political circumstances?
come_to_think: (Signature)
1  Introduction

What I mean to criticize here is a cluster of ways of talking about human beings that have existed for a long time, but have typically made use of the word "identity" since that usage was popularized in the 1950s by a psychologist who called himself Erik Erikson and who I think was a crackpot.  That word has legitimate uses, but as the pernicious pseudoconcept I am concerned with here, it is often expanded as "who you are".  Other expressions that have been used instead of or in association with it are "essence", "self", "core", and "heart".  Of these, "essence" is the oldest.  Bertrand Russell (A History of Western Philosophy, Ch. XXII) says:


...The notion of essence is an intimate part of every philosophy subsequent to Aristotle, until we come to modern times.  It is, in my opinion, a hopelessly muddle-headed notion, but its historical importance requires us to say something about it.

The "essence" of a thing appears to have meant "those of its properties which it cannot change without losing its identity."  Socrates may be sometimes happy, sometimes sad; sometimes well, sometimes ill.  Since he can change these properties without ceasing to be Socrates, they are no part of his essence.  But it is supposed to be of the essence of Socrates that he is a man, though a Pythagorean, who believes in transmigration, will not admit this.  In fact, the question of "essence" is one as to the use of words.  We apply the same name, on different occasions, to somewhat different occurrences, which regard as manifestations of a single "thing" or "person."  In fact, however, this is only a verbal convenience.  The "essence" of Socrates thus consists of those properties in the absence of which we should not use the name "Socrates."...
come_to_think: (Signature)
Evidently, if the appeal to nature is foolishness, it is natural foolishness, and as such deserves some attempt at sympathetic understanding.  A notable attempt at a balanced view is provided by Bertrand Russell.  In "What I Believe" he says

There is a certain attitude about the application of science to human life with which I have some sympathy, though I do not, in the last analysis, agree with it.  It is the attitude of those who dread what is "unnatural."...  I think there is a mixture of truth and falsehood in the admiration of "nature" which it is important to disentangle.  To begin with, what is "natural"?  Roughly speaking, anything to which the speaker was accustomed in childhood....  Clothes and cooking are too ancient to be denounced by most of the apostles of nature, though they object to new fashions in either....  [T]hose who preach "nature" are inconsistent, and one is tempted to regard them as mere conservatives.

Nevertheless, there is something to be said in their favor....  [I]n the absence of knowledge, unexpected harm may be done by a new departure from nature; but when the harm has come to be understood it can usually be remedied by some new artificiality.  As regards our physical environment and our physical means of gratifying our desires, I do not think the doctrine of "nature" justifies anything beyond a certain experimental caution in the adoption of new expedients.  Clothes, for instance, are contrary to nature and need to be supplemented by another unnatural practice --- namely, washing --- if they are not to bring disease.  But the two practices together make a man healthier than the savage who eschews both.

There is more to be said for "nature" in the realm of human desires.  To force upon a man, woman, or child a life which thwarts their strongest impulses is both cruel and dangerous; in this sense, a life according to "nature" is to be commended with certain provisos.  Nothing could be more artificial than an underground electric railway, but no violence is done to a child's nature when it is taken to travel in one; on the contrary, almost all children find the experience delightful.  Artificialities which gratify the desires of ordinary human beings are good, other things being equal.  But there is nothing to be said for ways of life which are artificial in the sense of being imposed by authority or economic necessity....

To the charming example of children in subway cars one might, in our day, add the potent one of children using computers.

In "Scylla and Charybdis, or Communism and Fascism", tho, he loses his balance:

...Where living beings are concerned, and most of all in the case of human beings, spontaneous growth tends to produce certain results, and others can be produced only by means of a certain stress and strain.  Embryologists may produce beasts with two heads, or with a nose where a toe should be; but such monstrosities do not find life very pleasant....  It is possible to cut shrubs into the shape of peacocks, and by a similar violence a similar distortion can be inflicted upon human beings.  But the shrub remains passive, while the man...remains active, if not in one sphere then in another.  The shrub cannot pass on the lesson in the use of shears which the gardener has been teaching, but the distorted human being can always find humbler human beings upon whom he can wield smaller shears.  The inevitable effects of artificial moulding upon human beings are to produce either cruelty or listlessness, perhaps both in alternation....

...The ultimate psychological argument for democracy and for patience is that an element of free growth, of go as you please and untrained natural living, is essential if men are not to become misshapen monsters....

I fancy there are better arguments for democracy & patience than that.  One might retort that nature can produce monstrosities without the help of embryologists; that they need not find life any less pleasant than their normal parents do, and may even be the beginnings of new species; and that we can hardly avoid artificial molding of human beings, which are (as Skinner points out) the most domesticated species of all.  In this respect even the earlier passage is somewhat incoherent.  People's "strongest impulses" are not necessarily the natural ones.

Mention of children, however, does bring up one fact about human nature that is of great moral importance --- tho more for the problems it creates than for the guidance it provides.  That is the fact that as infants we need to be taken care of, and so as a species we have to be provided with instincts for caring and for being cared for.  We share that program, of course, with other mammals & with birds, but we have carried it to an extreme.  A vast range of habits, including especially those that enable us to live together, is left to upbringing.  As Isaac Asimov ("No Connection") imagines an intelligent bear describing us, we are "gregarious without being social":  We have an inborn need to live with each other, but no inborn ways to do it.  That means, in particular, that the notion of liberty has to be reconstructed in each individual over a period of years.  (From the way some libertarians talk, you might think they had hatched & walked away on all eight legs.)

IMO nature deserves far more respect in esthetics than in ethics.  It is odd that people tend to think of esthetics in connection with art; it seems to me that most of the ugliness in the world is due to art (e.g., make-up, motel signs, Mylar balloons, newspaper advertising supplements, rock and roll, small-business storefronts, and station breaks on vulgar radio stations), and most of the beauty is due to nature.  Except for music, I see little use in trying to create beauty; it is more important to find it & try to avoid destroying it.
come_to_think: (Chessie)
In his charming essay "On Catholic and Protestant Skeptics" (1928; reprinted in Why I Am Not a Christian), Bertrand Russell calls Home Life with Herbert Spencer, by Two, "one of the most delightful books in existence".  I first harkened to that recommendation some decades ago, but of course the book was way out of print.  In 2006 & 2008 I made two attempts to extract it from the Harvard library.  The first one almost succeeded --- it was in the stacks, but was falling apart, so the man at the desk would not let me check it out; it had to be repaired first.  On the second attempt, I had to have it retrieved from a depository; the retrieval failed, and the book disappeared from the catalog.

It just occurred to me to google it, and sure enough, there it is: www.archive.org/stream/homelifewithherb00unknuoft#page/n0/mode/2up, a pleasantly readable photocopy of the printed book.  I have gotten to p. 70.  Stuffy people, those Victorians, but they managed to have a lot of fun & even conceive our grandparents.

It seems to me that the only reason to keep up libraries is that the Internet may well turn out to be too good to be true.

Profile

come_to_think: (Default)
come_to_think

November 2022

S M T W T F S
  12345
6789101112
13141516171819
20212223 242526
27282930   

Syndicate

RSS Atom

Most Popular Tags

Style Credit

Expand Cut Tags

No cut tags
Page generated Jun. 8th, 2025 09:41 pm
Powered by Dreamwidth Studios